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A REQUIEM FOR THE IFQ IN U.S. FISHERIES
Keith R. Criddle and Seth Macinko

ABSTRACT

Despite their apparent economic benefits to harvesters, Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs)
have only been adopted in three U.S. fisheries: Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog; South
Atlantic wreckfish; and North Pacific halibut and sablefish. During the 1996 reauthorization of
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Congress temporarily
blocked implementation of additional IFQ programs in U.S. fisheries. In this paper, we argue
that because of the emergence of an alternative, the cooperative, it is unlikely that new IFQs will
be adopted in federally managed U.S. fisheries. From an economic perspective, cooperatives
offer the advantage of eliminating production externalities that may remain under an IFQ
program with relatively large owner classes. More significantly, development ofIFQ programs
appear to be increasingly overwhelmed by the proliferation of both equity concerns and
seemingly interminable rent-seeking behavior-both issues that can effectively block adoption of
IFQs. Ironically (and paradoxically?), by reducing the scope of the equity issues acknowledged,
the cooperative alternative narrows the pool of claimants and modifies the behavior of the
remainder so as to make implementation more likely. A further irony exists in that IFQs are
widely thought to be best designed at the local/regional level while part of the appeal of the
cooperative model is that it appears to shortcut the often protracted nature of the local/regional
political process by relying on direct Congressional intervention.
Key words: individual fishing quotas, fishery cooperatives

A REQUIEM FOR THE IFQ IN U.S. FISHERIES

Introduction
Individual Fishing Quotas- The classic papers by Gordon (1953, 1954) and Scott (1955, 1979, and
1988), among others, reasoned that the multiplicity of users characteristic of open access commercial
fisheries would dissipate potential resource rents in a race for fish whereas a sole owner endowed with
comprehensive property rights would, acting as a monopolist, harvest the stock in such a way to capture
the available rent. Because sole ownership was not politically feasible, economists began to explore
alternatives that might achieve comparable benefits. Entry limitation emerged as a politically feasible
alternative to sole ownership that was argued to potentially achieve comparable efficiency gains (Christy
and Scott, 1965; Gulland and Robinson, 1973). Based on these arguments, several limited entry schemes
were implemented in the 1970's. However, it quickly became apparent that where there existed
unrestricted inputs that were at least imperfect substitutes for the restricted input(s), entry limitation per se
could not control the race for fish and dissipation of resource rents (Rettig and Ginter, 1978; Adasiak,
1979; Fraser, 1979; Meany, 1979; Pearse and Wilen, 1979; Wilen, 1979).
This led most economists to recommend abandonment of input controls (such as entry limitation) in favor
of output controls in the form of individual quotas (Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Pearse 1980; Morey,
1980). Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) are allocations offish harvesting quotas to individuals or firms,
specifying that a certain amount of fish or shellfish of a certain species may be caught in a specific area
during a specific time frame. IFQs are best suited to fisheries managed by setting a Total Allowable Catch
(TAC). Indeed, IFQs are usually expressed as shares of the TAC, so that the amount of fish that can be
harvested for a given share of quota fluctuates with changes in the level of the TAC. 1 The TAC is usually
determined on an annual basis by applying a target exploitation rate to an estimate of the current stock
size. Determining the target exploitation rate and measuring the stock size are both subject to considerable
uncertainty because of large variability in the relationship between stock size and subsequent recruitment
and to general difficulty of accurately counting and measuring fish in the wild. Wilen (1985) and Scott
(1988), among others, argue that the set of individuals endowed with IFQs will behave in a manner
analogous to the sole owner. This conclusion is driven by the assumptions that the harvest right is secure,
that cheating does not occur, that there are no unique spatial or temporal concentrations that could lead to
a race for fish, and that any returns to scale are captured. Some authors (e.g. 10hnson and Libecap, 1982;
and Keen, 1983), drawing on the property rights literature (e.g. Demsetz, 1967; Cheung, 1970; and De
Alessi, 1980), argue that usufructuary harvest rights without authority to independently determine harvest
levels, are insufficient to induce the resource stewardship expected under sole-ownership.
IFQs are defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) as
limited access permits to harvest quantities offish. They represent quasi-privatization of the fisheries, in
that permittees hold exclusive privileges with some of the attributes of private property-such as the
privilege to decide when and how to use the quota shares-but not others, including ownership of the
resource itself or the ability to decide how much of the resource can be harvested in aggregate. The latter
remains the domain of state and federal governments, which have responsibilities to manage fishery
resources for the public in terms of broad public welfare conceptions and the more specific obligations
implied by the public trust doctrine. 2
Several IFQ programs were implemented during the 1980's and 1990's, including three in the U.S.: MidAtlantic Surf Clam-Ocean Quahog (MAFMC 1990); South Atlantic Wreckfish (SAFMC 1992); and,
North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish (NPFMC 1995). Two additional IFQ programs: Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper (GFMC 1995) and Pacific Sablefish (PFMC 1995) were approved by their respective regional

I

Although the TAC in IFQ fisheries is usually expressed in weight (biomass), the Wisconsin lake trout IFQ is expressed in number of fish.

2 Confusion between general "public interest" mandates and the "public trust doctrine" is widespread. On the latter generally see McCay (1998),
on the relationship between the latter and IFQs see Macinko (1993), and for an attempt to bridge between the two concepts see NRC (1999).
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fishery management councils, but expressly blocked from implementation by language included in the
1996 reauthorization of the MSFCMA.
While many post-implementation analyses have concluded that IFQs have resulted in the hypothesized
benefits (see e.g. Crothers, 1988; Geen and Nayer, 1988; Dewees, 1989; Amason, 1993; Gauvin et al.
1994; Casey et al. 1995; Wang, 1995; Annala, 1996; Amason, 1996; Herrmann, 1996; Weninger, 1998)
other analyses and theoretical papers have identified potential shortcomings (Copes, 1986; Boyce, 1992;
Linder et al. 1992; Edwards, 1994; McCay, 1995; Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte, 1996; Copes,
1997; Matulich and Sever, 1999).
Evidence from the three U.S. IFQ fisheries suggest that IFQs have increased net revenues for the
harvesters and integrated harvester-processors that were initial recipients of the IFQ, consolidated the
number of active harvest platfonns, and distributed landings over longer seasons (Gauvin et al. 1994;
Casey et al. 1995; Wang, 1995; NRC, 1999; Herrmann, 2000). Evidence with respect to quota busting,
highgrading, and bycatch is mixed. In addition, stock and production externalities have not been
eliminated, wealth and opportunity of other stakeholders, e.g. processors, may have been reduced, and
rent-seeking associated with acquisition and defense of the IFQ may have dissipated much of the windfall
gain associated with the initial distribution.

Fishery Cooperatives-A recent innovation, the cooperative, has emerged as an alternative to IFQs in
fisheries off the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. In a manner analogous to unitized-field management in the
petroleum industry, cooperative members rely on civil law to enforce contracts that partition the catch
among a limited set of participants and rely on government to enforce usufructuary rights to a fraction of
the resource. The first of these new entities, the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (PWCC) was
established in 1997 following a series of critical fonnative events. Creation of the PWCC hinged on three
components of the management regime for the whiting fishery. First, the fishery is run under an overall
TAC established by the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC). Second, the PFMC had created a
distinct "offshore" sub-allocation of the overall TAC. Third, the PFMC had limited entry into the offshore
sector of the whiting fishery. The combined effect of these three elements of the management regime is
that participants in the offshore fishery were free from external rivals and could contemplate the benefits
of cooperation without confronting free-rider problems. The final critical step was receipt of a favorable
review letter from the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division declaring that the proposed cooperative
did not raise prohibitive anti-trust issues. PWCC is, effectively, the sole owner of a fixed percentage of
the Pacific whiting TAC and, through negotiated contract, has partitioned that ownership among the coop
members. (See Larkin and Sylvia (1999) for a brief description of the fonnation ofPWCC.)
The Americanization policies embodied in successive reauthorizations of the MSFCMA led to an
evolution of participation in the groundfisheries off Alaska, from nearly 100% foreign in the mid-1970's
to almost entirely joint venture by the mid 1980's and fully domestic by 1990. By 1991, harvesting
capacity was estimated to be double what was needed to harvest the TAC and processing capacity was
about 150% of processing needs. In the first of a sequence of allocation battles, the NPFMC established
Community Development Quotas (CDQ) and a directed fishing allocation between inshore an offshore 3
fleets (NPFMC 1991). The inshore-offshore allocation was revisited again in 1995 and 1998 (NPFMC
1995, 1998). In 1996, the Council belatedly adopted a moratorium on entry to the BSAI groundfisheries.
Despite these measures, harvesting and processing power continued to expand under the ever-escalating
stimulus of the race for fish. Between 1994 and 1998, half of the catcher-processors operating in the
BSAI underwent bankruptcy or forced sale of their vessel holdings (APA 1999).

The offshore sector included catcher-processors, motherships, and catcher vessel that delivered to them. The inshore sector includes catcher
vessels that deliver to shore based processors or permanently anchored floating processors.
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Heartened by their experience in the whiting fishery, members of the PWCC who also participated in the
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) pollock fishery joined with other BSAI catcher-processors to
lobby Congress for authority to create a similar structure in the BSAI pollock fishery. Congressional
action was sought because the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) had not created a
sufficiently closed group of offshore participants and corresponding sub-allocation of the T AC. The
catcher-processors were not alone in petitioning Congress for specific intervention in the management of
the BSAI pollock fishery. Shore-based pollock processors, floating "mothership" pollock processors,
Alaska Native groups, and an assortment of pollock catcher boat interests all sought to advance or simply
protect their respective interests in a lobbying fray that was united only in the sense of mutual frustration
with the decade-long attempts of the NPFMC to address economic and social aspects of the BSAI pollock
fishery.4 The result was the American Fisheries Act of 1998 (AFA). In the AFA, Congress provided a
legal mechanism to permanently cap entry, directly identified the eligible members of the pollock catcherprocessor sector (by vessel name), specified their collective sub-allocation of the BSAI pollock TAC, and
provided a mechanism for $75 million in side-payments to buyout 9 of the 29 catcher-processors then
operating. In direct response to the AF A, the nine companies that control the 20 AF A-authorized catcherprocessor vessels formed the Pollock Conservation Cooperative (PCC). PCC was operational in late
January of 1999, the beginning of the first pollock season following passage of the AFA. During the
initial pollock season the PCC consolidated the number of active vessels, reduced harvest and throughput
rates, increased yield rates from harvested fish, and changed their production mix to higher valued
product forms. The allocation of harvest shares within the PCC (i.e., the partitioning of the Congressional
'offshore' allocation to individual PCC member firms and their respective vessels) is accomplished
through private contract negotiations. These contracts are, like any private contract, backed by relevant
civil and state authority.
The AF A included a provision that assured the seven catcher vessels that had traditionally delivered to
catcher-processors of3.4% of the directed fishing allocation. The owners of these vessels formed the
High Seas Catchers' Cooperative (HSCC) in 1999 to rationalize their harvests. Most members if HSCC
sold or leased their pollock catch shares to PCC members in 1999 and 2000. Harvesters that deliver to
shore-based and permanently anchored floating processors, and motherships and the catcher vessels that
regularly deliver to them were also empowered to form cooperatives as early as January 2000, and are
currently fishing under their inaugural season. Table 1 shows the allocation shares just prior to and
immediately following implementation of the AFA.
Table I-Allocation of pollock T AC before and after implementation of the AF A.
Bycatch set aside
CDQ
Shore based
Mothership
Catcher-Processor
Catcher Vessels that Deliver to Catcher-Processors

1998
- 5%
7.5%
30.6%
8.8%
45 .2%
3.0%

1999
- 4.7%
10.0%
42.7%
8.5%
31.2%
2.9%

Under AF A, 9 companies operating 20 catcher-processors are assured harvest rights to 36.6% of the
directed fishing allocation (-31 % of the TAC). While this is a substantial reduction from the 1998
catcher-processor share of approximately 45% of the T AC, the AF A included a provision to buyout nine
of the 29 then active catcher-processors, consequently the average catch per AFA-qualified catcher
processor did not decline (Table 2). In fact, because only 16 of the AFA-qualified catcher-processors
participated in the 1999 Winter-Spring season, the average catch per AFA-qualified catcher-processor
increased in 1999 relative to what it would have been in the absence of the AFA and with all 29 catcher-

Although the NPFMC initiated discussion of a Comprehensive Rationalization Plan in 1992, consideration stalled when arguments were
advanced to suggest that efficiency considerations should include processors and other entities (Matulich et al. 1996; Matulich and Sever 1999).
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processors active. Average catch per catcher-processor is expected to increase further in 2000 with the
sale of Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc. to other PCC members.
Table 2-Average catches (1,000 mt) in 1999 and 2000 with and without the AF A.
W/O AFA

AFA-qualified Catcher-Processors
Active AFA-qualified Catcher-Processors
Catcher Vessels that Deliver to Catcher-Processors

1999
15.5
15.5
4.2

2000
17.8
17.8
4.9

WI AFA

1999
15.5
19.4
4. I

2000
17.8
23 .7
4.7

Under the PCC, the operating season for catcher-processors increased from 75 days in 1998 to 149 days
in 1999. In addition, PCC members increased product recovery by 20% per fish through slower paced
harvesting, increased trawl mesh size, and shorter hauls (AP A 1999). Although the overall mix of surimi
and fillet production only changed slightly, the fraction of high value fillets (deep-skin) increased
substantially with offsetting decreases in the production of lower grade mince and block fillets.
Significantly, participants in the Bering Sea crab fisheries have been actively pursuing design of an AFAstyle cooperative and proposals for various forms of cooperatives for groundfish fisheries in the Gulf of
Alaska are under preparation by participants in those fisheries. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the
National Marine Fisheries Service has identified the cooperative model (to the exclusion ofIFQs) as the
management tool to address all concerns related to the social and economic character of the North Pacific
fisheries (NMFS 2000).
It thus appears that after only an embryonic trial, IFQs may be an artifact of history, displaced by the
apparently greater appeal of the cooperative model. In the remainder of this paper, we examine in further
detail the reasons why this evolution away from IFQs is occurring and its implications.

Sole Owners, Quota Share Holders, and Cooperatives: The view from economic
theory and beyond.
Three conventional arguments for rationalizing fisheries are: 1) Increased economic efficiency; 2)
Improved conservation and stewardship; and 3) Improved safety. The basis for each of these arguments is
relatively straightforward. Excess capacity leads to compressed seasons, reduced exvessel prices, and
compromised safety. Gear loss and gear conflict are commonly reported problems in temporally
compressed fisheries. Economic theory and empirical observations suggest that the economic rents
potentially available to harvests will be dissipated under the race for fish that commonly results under the
combination of TAC management and either open access or input restrictions. In the following subsections, we review each of these three arguments by contrasting IFQs with the cooperative alternative.

Efficiency-Early speculation about the potential efficiency gains of IFQs stressed the discontinuation of
high-cost fishing practices followed during the derby fishery. While these may be significant, much of the
capital invested in fishing is durable and is unlikely to be subject to immediate replacement. Recent
attention has focused on potential increased exvessel prices that arise from improved product handling
and improved product flow to market. Figure 1 illustrates these effects.

5

Average catches declined in 1999 relative to 1998 due to a reduction in the pollock T AC.
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Figure I - The effect of a $0.55/lb. increase in the exvessel price and a 10% reduction in harvest costs.
Thin lines reflect conditions prior to the price increase and cost decrease.

The by now standard critique of open access fisheries holds that the steady-state open-access solution
equates total revenues and total costs and fails to produce economic profits. By contrast, a sole-owner
equates marginal revenue and marginal cost, harvests an amount h;y, and earns II ( h;y ) . That is, in the
above example, the open access solution is to produce a sustainable yield of about 72 million pounds at an
exvessel price of $1.50 per pound and resulting in zero net revenues. The sole owner would choose to
harvest a sustainable yield of about 41 million pounds at an exvessel price of $2.25 per pound for net
revenues of about $75 million, in this example. Suppose that there n identical IFQ shareholders. If they
act together to restrain catch, they each harvest ~ ( h;y ) and each gains ~ II ( h;y ) , and together they earn
$75 million. If one shareholder chooses to overproduce by 8 then the total profit will be reduced by
II ( h;y ) - II ( h;y - 8) . The profits earned by the shareholders who stick to the agreed harvest are reduced
to ~ II ( h;y - 8). The cheater's profits increase to ~ II ( h;y - 8) + II ( 8) . As long as

~ II ( h;y - 8) < II ( 8), it pays to cheat. But if the shareholders are homogenous and everyone cheats, they
* - n8 < hsy
* - 8 < hsy
* . Recommended
each earn -;1(*
II hsy - n8 ) and all are worse off because hsy

solutions to this n person common-pool dilemma include moral suasion and private or public policing of
the agreement to hold individual harvests to ~ ( h;y ) , (Ostrom et al. 1994). When n is large and
shareholders are heterogeneous, moral suasion is unlikely to be efficacious and the transactions costs
associated with negotiating and enforcing private agreements may be prohibitive. Thus, government
intervention in the form of "rationalization" programs such as IFQs is frequently called for (Coase, 1960;
Cheung, 1970; Johnson and Libecap, 1989; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994).
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The strict economic perspective on fisheries management is focused on rational "allocation" in the pursuit
of efficiency and usually pays little attention to what are regarded as mere "distributional" issues.
However, distributional issues tend to dominate the real world setting of fisheries management. The trend
in U.S. IFQ programs has been one of an ever-broader suite of stakeholders, increased restriction on
consolidation, and increased provisions against absentee ownership. The Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam-Ocean
Quahog IFQ program (MAFMC 1990) used catch history as a basis for the initial IFQ distribution,
allowed for transferability and leasing, and did not set ownership concentration limits. The South Atlantic
Wreckfish IFQ program (SAFMC 1992) based 50% of the initial allocation on catch history with the
remainder allocated as equal shares among the initial recipients. Permanent transfers are unrestricted, but
leasing is only allowed among IFQ owners. An ownership cap of 10% was imposed on the initial IFQ
allocation, but not on subsequent transfers. The North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish IFQ program (NPFMC
1995) settled on a catch history based initial allocation to vessel owners and bare-boat leaseholders.
Although ownership shares were not capped in the initial allocation, subsequent transfers are subject to
region specific caps between 0.5 and 1 percent of the regionally apportioned TAC. Initial recipients and
individuals with prior crew-experience are the only eligible quota share buyers and transfers are not
allowed from small vessel classes to large vessel classes. With a few minor exceptions, leasing is
prohibited. Inclusion of skippers and crew in the initial allocation was summarily dismissed (Macinko
1993), as were potential impacts on processors. However, a subsequent consideration ofIFQs for all
remaining North Pacific groundfish fisheries featured prolonged considerations of these entities in
addition to vessel owners (NPFMC 1994). The Pacific Sablefish (PFMC 1995) and Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper (GFMC 1995) IFQ programs blocked by the 1996 reauthorization of MSFMA include provisions
that continue the trend towards recognition of an expanded class of stakeholders and restrictions on
concentration and absentee ownership. The Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper program would have included
skippers in the initial allocation. The Pacific Sablefish program would have imposed 1% ownership caps
and restricted leasing. Recognition of an ever-broadened set of stakeholders increases the number and
heterogeneity of participants. Ownership caps and restrictions on transfers between vessel categories
preserve heterogeneity and set a lower bound on the number of participants. Under these conditions, it is
unlikely that the n-person common-pool dilemma will be solved in a manner that maximizes net revenues
across included shareholders.
In addition, the Council process encourages rent-seeking that dissipates potential rents and dilutes the
quota share pool. While this is most evident in the processes leading up to the adoption of an IFQ
program and the accompanying initial allocation, it continues as IFQ shareholders defend the value of
their quota shares from efforts to increase the share pool. For example, North Pacific halibut-sablefish
IFQ shareholders have fought proposals to increase the amount of halibut allocated to CDQ and sport
fisheries, proposals to create a subsistence fishery set aside, proposals to create additional shares (dilute
the existing shares) for individuals who established catch histories after the control date, proposals to
create additional shares (dilute the existing shares) for crew and skippers, proposals to restrict the regional
transfer of quota share ownership, and proposals to require that halibut be landed at ports within the
region where it was caught.
In contrast to the ever-widening pool of stakeholder/claimants to IFQ programs, Cooperatives offer the
advantage of small numbers and greater homogeneity, thereby reducing transactions, monitoring, and
enforcement costs (that is, these outcomes are perceived as advantages by those recipients of the benefits
cooperatives offer, obviously those excluded may regard these same outcomes as disadvantages). But
cooperatives offer further distinct advantages (again as understood from a particular perspective) besides
simply defining a smaller pool of beneficiaries-cooperatives are administratively and procedurally
efficient and are unencumbered by the restrictions on share concentration, absentee ownership, leasing,
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and transfer that have characterized recent IFQ programs. By negotiating private agreements and
securing Justice Department acquiescence and Congressional support, cooperatives have avoided the
public hearing process and analysis requirements of the Environmental Protection Act (Environmental
Assessment), the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Regulatory Impact Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis), and the MSFCMA (National Standards).7

Resource Conservation and Stewardship-Under IFQs, there is greater flexibility in selecting fishing
time and area, with the possibility of reduced bycatch and greater product recovery. In addition, IFQ
fishers may set (and lose) less gear, thereby reducing ghost fishing and damage that lost gear may cause
to the marine environment. IFQs may create opportunities and incentives for highgrading and quota
busting. However, sorting and discarding fish will occur only if the expected benefits exceed the cost of
sorting and the cost of catching replacement fish (including the opportunity cost of time and the expected
cost of penalties and sanctions). Quota busting is most likely to occur when overage penalties are low and
there is little chance of detection. Actual conservation benefits are an empirical question with mixed
answers.
The argument that the community of IFQ holders will internalize stock externalities suffers from the
common-pool dilemma described above. Because quota shares are usufructuary rights to a share of the
common resource and not rights to particular fish, shareholders have no assurance that others will refrain
from practices that prevent the sustainable use of fish stocks and may conserve at less than the socially
optimal level, especially when shareholders are numerous and heterogeneous.
To the extent that cooperatives feature smaller and more homogeneous memberships, stock externalities
will be internalized to a greater degree than they would be in an IFQ program. However, under both IFQs
and cooperatives, the fish stocks remain fugitive resources that are fully susceptible to truly external
threats such as pollution events. Similarly, both IFQ holders and cooperative participants may (influenced
by private discount rate calculations) arrive at a conclusion regarding optimal strategies that deliberately
does not sustain the resource (Clark 1973). In summary, the cooperative model may resolve certain
externalities relative to IFQs while sharing most of the same stewardship incentives and disincentives.

Safety-Because IFQs increase the opportunity for fishers to choose when to fish, weather conditions, the
condition of the vessel, or other safety factors can be considered and hazardous conditions can be
avoided. Nevertheless, fishers may choose to ignore hazardous conditions in order to service contracted
deliveries. Similar constraints and incentives will be present in cooperative fisheries.

The Talk About Cooperatives
One way to assess why cooperatives are preferred over IFQs is to simply listen to the way cooperative
proponents talk about the two systems in comparative terms. Participants in the debates over cooperatives
and IFQs perceive distinct and fundamental differences between the two options:
[T]here is a fundamental policy to think about for IFQs vs. co-ops. IFQs in future programs have a
trail of people who want a piece of the pie- environmentalists, crew members, and communities. Coops don't have these restrictions in place for the needed give-aways that would occur. (NPFMC 1999)
As we have alluded to, stakeholder diversity is perceived to be problematic under IFQs whereas
cooperatives offer the possibility of defining a narrower group of beneficiaries. What is interesting is how
this narrower group is perceived to be beneficial. The captains of industry who are proponents of

Note that we are fully aware of and stress that what appears to be "efficient" to some appears equally abusive of established public processes to
others.
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Ironically, although cut out of the decision-making process, the Councils have been required to demonstrate that the cooperatives conform with
MSFCMA national standards and to develop supportive post hoc EA/RlR/IRFA analyses.
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cooperatives do not stress elimination of production externalities or preservation of aggregate rents.
Rather, what is important is the rather obvious conclusion that including fewer stakeholders means
sharing available rents amongst fewer rent-seekers. In economic terms, the choice of cooperatives over
IFQs (like so many other debates in fisheries management) turns on issues of distribution rather than
allocation. Aggregate rents are important in theory but relative rents drive the political process.
The second category of distinction between cooperatives and IFQs (transactions costs) is noticeably
absent from the public talk about cooperatives. Clearly fewer stakeholders ought to facilitate interstakeholder negotiations but the pronounced focus is on rents as noted above. That is not to say, however,
that there is little public attention to the implications for organizational dynamics involved in the choice
between IFQs and cooperatives. Commenting on the choice, one self-avowed supporter of IFQs noted that
he:
... didn't like the way the sablefish and halibut program turned out with all the bells and
whistles ... [and was] more in favor of co-ops, because it takes the government out of the equation of
managing fishermen. (NPFMC 1999)
While not directly commenting on either rents or transactions costs, this comment is notable for
highlighting an aspect of the cooperative model that has received relatively little attention. The bypassing
of the NMFS/Regional Fishery Management Council system established by Congress in the MSFCMA is
one of the major benefits perceived by proponents of cooperatives. Ironically, it appears that the
local/regional decision-making basis that is recommended for future IFQs (see NRC 1999) is precisely
what cooperative proponents seek to avoid by appealing directly to Congress. One possible explanation is
that the Council process enfranchises broader stakeholder participation and requires a lengthy public
process, defined in law and regulation, of identifying alternatives and exploring the economic and social
effects of those alternatives. While the costs of currying Congressional favor could rise to the level of
rent-seeking costs involved in obtaining a favorable rights-allocation through the Council process, the
current interest in cooperatives suggests that industry anticipates that it would be more costly (or likely to
produce lower windfall gains) to work through the Council. Ironically, rent-seeking costs associated with
either approach could dissipate the entire windfall gain associated with the gratis award of harvesting
rights.

Conclusion
What conclusions can be reached on the basis of the brief comparative review presented above? Perhaps a
better way to phrase this question is to ask whether the comparative review provides an explanation for
the relative abandonment of IFQs and the embrace of cooperatives? On the one hand, it is hard to
distinguish cooperatives from IFQs on the basis of the conventional points of emphasis in rationalization
debates. The clearest distinctions discerned were that cooperatives narrow the group of beneficiaries and
pursue adoption and implementation via truncated approval processes. But viewed in this manner, these
distinctions have rarely featured as primary arguments for any rationalization scheme. On the other hand,
it is clearly possible to cast these distinctions in terms of conventional arguments. Reducing the scope of
the stakeholders recognized could mean preservation of potential rents through the elimination of
production externalities and the reduction of transactions costs involved in the adoption and
implementation process. Nevertheless, because the MSFCMA requires that where they are created,
harvest rights must be assigned gratis, the development and initial allocation phases of IFQs and
cooperatives will induce rent-seeking behavior that when coupled with the rent-seeking costs associated
with defending the harvest right from being diluted through recognition of additional claimants could
entirely dissipate the benefits of rationalization. Shifting the venue for rent-seeking from the
locallregionallevel represented by the Council to the more remote level represented by Congress, may
affect who emerges with the fishing right, but doesn't eliminate the rent-seeking behavior that reduces the
net benefits of IFQs or cooperatives.
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Abstract. Despite their apparent economic benefits to harvesters, Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) have
only been adopted in three U.S. fisheries: Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog; South Atlantic
wreckfish; and, North Pacific halibut and sablefish. During the 1996 reauthorization of the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Congress temporarily blocked implementation of
additional IFQ programs in U.S. fisheries. In this paper, we argue that because of the emergence of an
alternative, the cooperative, it is unlikely that new IFQs will be adopted in federally managed U.S.
fisheries. From an economic perspective, cooperatives offer the advantage of eliminating production
externalities that may remain under an IFQ program with relatively large owner classes. More
significantly, development ofIFQ programs appears to be increasingly overwhelmed by the proliferation
of both equity concerns and seemingly interminable rent-seeking behavior- both issues that can
effectively block adoption ofIFQs. Ironically (and paradoxically?), by reducing the scope of the equity
issues acknowledged, the cooperative alternative narrows the pool of claimants and modifies the behavior
of the remainder so as to make implementation more likely. A further irony exists in that IFQs are widely
thought to be best designed at the locallregionallevel while part of the appeal of the cooperative model is
that it appears to shortcut the often protracted nature of the locallregional political process by relying on
direct congressional intervention.
Keywords: Individual fishing quotas, Fishery cooperatives.

Introduction
Individual Fishing Quotas- The classic papers by Gordon (1953, 1954) and Scott (1955, 1979, and
1988), among others, reasoned that the multiplicity of users characteristic of open access commercial
fisheries would dissipate potential resource rents in a race for fish whereas a sole owner endowed with
comprehensive property rights would, acting as a monopolist, harvest the stock in such a way to capture
the available rent. Because sole ownership was not politically feasible, economists began to explore
alternatives that might achieve comparable benefits. Entry limitation emerged as a politically feasible
alternative to sole ownership that was argued to potentially achieve comparable efficiency gains (Christy
and Scott, 1965; Gulland and Robinson, 1973). Based on these arguments, several limited entry schemes
were implemented in the 1970's. However, it quickly became apparent that where there existed
unrestricted inputs that were at least imperfect substitutes for the restricted input( s), entry limitation per se
could not control the race for fish and dissipation of resource rents (Rettig and Ginter, 1978; Adasiak,
1979; Fraser, 1979; Meany, 1979; Pearse and Wilen, 1979; Wilen, 1979).
This led most economists to recommend abandonment of input controls (such as entry limitation) in favor
of output controls in the form of individual quotas (Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Pearse 1980; Morey,
1980). Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) are allocations of fish harvesting quotas to individuals or firms,
specifying that a certain amount of fish or shellfish of a certain species may be caught in a specific area
during a specific time frame. IFQs are best suited to fisheries managed by setting a Total Allowable Catch
(TAC). Indeed, IFQs are usually expressed as shares of the TAC, so that the amount offish that can be
harvested for a given share of quota fluctuates with changes in the level of the TAC. I The TAC is usually
determined on an annual basis by applying a target exploitation rate to an estimate of the current stock
size. Determining the target exploitation rate and measuring the stock size are both subject to considerable
uncertainty because of large variability in the relationship between stock size and subsequent recruitment
and to general difficulty of accurately counting and measuring fish in the wild. Wilen (1985) and Scott
(1988), among others, argue that the set of individuals endowed with IFQs will behave in a manner
analogous to the sole owner. This conclusion is driven by the assumptions that the harvest right is secure,
that cheating does not occur, that there are no unique spatial or temporal concentrations that could lead to
a race for fish, and that any returns to scale are captured. Some authors (e.g. Johnson and Libecap, 1982;
and Keen, 1983), drawing on the property rights literature (e.g. Demsetz, 1967; Cheung, 1970; and De
Alessi, 1980), argue that usufructuary harvest rights without authority to independently determine harvest
levels, are insufficient to induce the resource stewardship expected under sole-ownership.
IFQs are defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) as
limited access permits to harvest quantities offish. They represent quasi-privatization of the fisheries, in
that permittees hold exclusive privileges with some of the attributes of private property-such as the
privilege to decide when and how to use the quota shares-but not others, including ownership of the
resource itself or the ability to decide how much of the resource can be harvested in aggregate. The latter
remains the domain of state and federal governments, which have responsibilities to manage fishery
resources for the public in terms of broad public welfare conceptions and the more specific obligations
implied by the public trust doctrine. 2
Several IFQ programs were implemented during the 1980's and 1990's, including three in the U.S.: MidAtlantic Surf Clam-Ocean Quahog (MAFMC 1990); South Atlantic Wreckfish (SAFMC 1992); and,
North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish (NPFMC 1995). Two additional IFQ programs: Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper (GFMC 1995) and Pacific Sablefish (PFMC 1995) were approved by their respective regional

I

Although the T AC in IFQ fisheries is usually expressed in weight (biomass), the Wisconsin lake trout IFQ is expressed in number of fish.

2 Confusion between general "public interest" mandates and the "public trust doctrine" is widespread. On the latter generally see McCay (1998),
on the relationship between the latter and IFQs see Macinko (1993), and for an attempt to bridge between the two concepts see NRC (\999).
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